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ÖSSZEFOGLALÁS 
A szocialista rendszer Magyarországon az 1990. évi első szabad választásokkal összeomlott. Az új kormány 
azonnal nekikezdett a magyar mezőgazdaság átszervezésének, sajnos elsősorban ideológiai szempontokra 
támaszkodva. 
A 70-es és 80-as években a mezőgazdaság a nemzetgazdaság sikerágazata volt, mivel szerkezetében egyaránt 
jelentős szerepet játszottak a korszak technológiai és piaci adottságaihoz sikeresen alkalmazkodó szövetkezeti 
nagyüzemek és kis háztáji gazdaságok. A rendszerváltás után az új kormány intézkedései felszámolták ezt a 
struktúrát. A szántóterületet felosztották, sok kisgazdaság jött létre. Az agribusiness hazánkban addig 
ismeretlen elemeként nemzetközi áruházláncok is megjelentek az élelmiszerpiacon, félelmeket és gondokat 
okozva számos termelőnek. A magyar mezőgazdaság jelenleg sem rendelkezik stabil struktúrával, mind a 
gazdaságok mérete, mind pedig tulajdonosi szerkezete állandóan változik, az alkalmazott termelési 
technológia pedig nem illeszkedik a kialakult új helyzethez, a jelen helyzetben nyereségesen termeszthető 
termékek köre nincs meghatározva. Mindezen problémák megoldása feltétlenül szükséges lenne a vidéken 
tapasztalható magas munkanélküliség csökkentéséhez. A jelen cikkben a fenti kérdéseket elemezzük, és 
javaslatokat teszünk lehetséges megoldásaikra.  
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ABSTRACT  
The so-called socialist regime collapsed in Hungary in May 1990 with the first free elections. The new 
government immediately started to reorganize the country's agriculture, but unfortunately on a mainly 
ideological basis. 
The agriculture of Hungary had been a successful branch of the national economy in the 1970's and 1980's, 
because its structure, including the co-operation of large farms and smallholders, was very effectively adapted 
to the technological conditions and market opportunities of the time. The measures introduced in the early 
nineties by the new government destroyed this structure. The arable land was split up and became the property 
of many owners, and this way a lot of new farms of very small size emerged. International supermarket chains 
also appeared on the Hungarian market. They are a new factor of agri-business earlier unknown in Hungary, 
causing a lot of fears and several problems. Hungarian agriculture still lacks a stable structure, i.e. the sizes 
and owners of farms keep changing, the applied farming technology is not adapted to the new situation, the 
products possible to grow in a profitable way are not clearly identified, though it would be necessary in order 
to solve the problem of high unemployment experienced in rural areas. All these problems are analyzed in this 
paper and suggestions for the solution are made. 
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DETAILED ABSTRACT 
In this paper the structural changes of Hungarian agriculture caused by the political turnover of 1990 are 
surveyed. 
The so-called socialist regime collapsed in Hungary in May 1990 with the first free elections. The new 
government immediately started to reorganize the country's agriculture, but unfortunately on a mainly 
ideological basis. 
It is shown that the demolition of the former co-operatives caused the emergence of small farms which are 
now the main form of farms dominating Hungarian agriculture.  
The agriculture of Hungary had been a successful branch of the national economy in the 1970's and 1980's, 
because its structure, including the co-operation of large farms and smallholders, was very effectively adapted 
to the technological conditions and market opportunities of the time. The measures introduced in the early 
nineties by the new government destroyed this structure. The arable land was split up and became the property 
of many owners, and this way a lot of new farms of very small size emerged. Hungarian agriculture still lacks 
a stable structure, i.e. the sizes and owners of farms keep changing, the applied farming technology is not 
adapted to the new situation, the products possible to grow in a profitable way are not clearly identified, 
though it would be necessary in order to solve the problem of high unemployment experienced in rural areas.  
The current structure has many malfunctions, including inefficient land size, lack of capital and up-to-date 
technology. In particular, it is difficult to find consumers for rural products of lower quality. International 
supermarket chains also appeared on the Hungarian market. They are a new factor of agri-business earlier 
unknown in Hungary, causing a lot of fears and several problems. On the other hand, rural areas are not well-
served by shops. Small food processing firms can increase the value added of the products, and at the same 
time decrease unemployment in the rural areas. Hovewer, processed food products cannot enter the supply of 
big chains without fulfilling the unified quality and packing requirements, supervised by integrators. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hungary is a small country in Central Europe. Its 
territory is 93,000 km
2. Considering land use, 
approximately 8 million ha is used for agriculture 
and related activities, of which 6 million ha is arable 
and a further 2 million ha is for other agricultural 
activities including forestry. The total population is 
10 million, of which 2 million people live in the 
capital called Budapest, which, of course, is the 
greatest food market within the country. The number 
of settlements is 3,300, of which 3000 are villages, 
located in mainly rural areas. 6% of the employees 
work in agriculture producing 4.5% of the total GDP 
of the country. The total share of agriculture 
(including the food and processing industry) in the 
national GDP is 15%([ 2] ).  
A short historical background of the recent events 
and processes is as follows. Until 1945 large estates 
dominated the sector and beside them smallholders 
existed. In 1945 the arable area of the former big 
estates was split up and distributed among the people 
of the villages.  Thus, until 1949 agricultural 
producers were only the smallholders in Hungary. 
When the communist party took over the power in 
1949 the first wave of „co-operativization” took 
place. Later, as a result of the 1956 revolution co-
operatives were demolished. Between 1959 and 1961 
a second wave of co-operativization took place. 
Then, between 1961 and 1990 the sector was 
dominated by co-operatives. The re-establishment of 
the market economy started in 1990 in Hungary. The 
first freely elected government made several 
attempts to demolish the co-operatives. These efforts 
have resulted in a farming structure mainly 
consisting of very small family farms ([ 1] ).  
The success of the former Hungarian agriculture 
dominated by co-operatives was based on the 
following structural elements after 1961:  
Every co-operative farmed a large arable area, 
approximately 600-2000 ha, or even more. 
The technology was adjusted to the size of the 
farmed land. This technology was the same as the 
leading technology of the world, introduced in 
Hungary with some delay.  
A new concept of "household farming" was also set 
up in the country. This meant, that the members of 
the co-operatives, besides working in the co-
operative, also had a tiny arable land to farm on their 
own, and in this way they all became (very) 
smallholders. This concept had been unknown in any 
other socialist country.  
Many ways of successful co-operation existed 
between the big farms, i.e. co-operatives, and the 
smallholders, i.e. household farming. The structure 
of corn/pig production may be mentioned as an 
example. The technology of the co-operatives was 
very appropriate for mass production, thus corn was 
produced by the co-operatives. At the same time, as 
animal husbandry requires more care, it was carried 
out by the household farms.  
The manpower superfluous in agriculture was 
utilized  by the industrial activities of the co-
operatives, such as building and construction, or 
small clothes factories, etc., which were called 
"sideline" activities of the co-operative. 
 
AFTER 1990 
The coalition coming into power after the free 
elections in 1990 opposed the existence of the co-
operatives on an ideological basis. Two legal ways 
were found to demolish them. The Parliament 
accepted a law, which allowed the members of the 
co-operatives to quit before a given deadline. As not 
enough members did so, the deadline was then 
extended several times. The same law required that 
the properties, including e.g. machinery, of the co-
operatives must be "nominated", i.e. assigned to the 
members. If a member quitted the co-op, the 
property automatically became his/her private 
property. A very bad side-effect of this process was, 
that complete sets of machines and tools, which had 
had a special practical value exactly because of their 
completeness, were split up, and distributed among 
several owners of small new farms who were not 
obligated to help each other. Thus the machinery sets 
lost their effectiveness, as none of the small new 
farms owned a complete technology then. At that 
time any kind of self-organized co-operation was 
unimaginable, because of the hostile atmosphere, and 
this applied to the common use of the machines, 
which had been commonly owned and used formerly 
([ 1] ).  
 The second step to demolish the co-operatives was a 
so-called "Law of Recompensation". Many people 
had lost their properties during the communists 
regime. This law entitled them, or their inheritors to 
compensation for the loss. However, the formerly 
lost  properties were not given back to the original 
owners. Instead, the state issued vouchers in a much B. VIZVÁRI, BACSI, ZS 
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smaller value than the value of the lost property, and 
the original owners were given these vouchers in 
proportion to the value of their lost property. The 
state offered stocks and land for these vouchers. All 
former big farms (co-operatives and state farms) 
were forced by the law to give up a certain portion of 
their land for this purpose. These lands were 
privatized in the subsequent winter seasons on 
special auctions. The compensation vouchers were 
used by way of payment in these auctions in their 
nominal value. A unit price was established for the 
land. Several optional values for the unit price were 
set in the law, and these options were used in the 
auctions in the following way. Each piece of land 
was offered by the representative of the state first for 
the highest optional value.  If nobody wanted to pay 
this price for the land, then it was offered for the 
second highest value, etc. Most of the land was sold 
for the smallest possible value as the local people 
managed to make agreements among themselves. 
Higher prices were achieved only when non-
residents appeared on the auction. This was not 
prohibited by the law, so it was possible for 
someone, who had lost a factory, to buy some 
farmland using the vouchers issued for the factory.  
 
As a result of these two laws, the co-operatives have 
lost a great part of their equipment and land.  
It should be underlined that the total value of the 
property offered in the compensation process was 
much less than the value of the compensation 
vouchers, which are still present on the stock market.  
The farms created on the land bought for 
compensation vouchers are usually too small for 
efficient farming. Furthermore, in many cases the 
new properties were too small for any agricultural 
activity. Many owners are not residents in the 
village, in the neighbourhood of which the land is 
situated. These reasons explain the fact, that there are 
only 300,000 new farms, but there are 1,300,000 new 
landowners. We may conclude, that the structure of 
the farm property system has been drastically 
changed from a system dominated by big farms, to a 
set of small farms.  
There are two important negative consequences of 
this change.  First, the credit worthiness of the small, 
badly equipped  farms is practically zero. Therefore 
investments in agriculture drastically decreased, as it 
is shown in Table 1. Thus the technology of farming 
has not been renewed in the appropriate time. This 
implies, that the future competitiveness of Hungarian 
agriculture can be seriously damaged.
 
 
Table 1: Agricultural investments in Hungary,1986-1998. 
Year Investment 
billion 
HUF 
Consumer 
price index 
Cumulativ
e price 
index 
Relative 
investment, as 
a percentage 
of 1986 
1986  27.1 -  -  100.00 
1987  35.2 1.059  1.059  122.65 
1988  26.8 1.065  1.128  87.68 
1989  25.7 1.037  1.170  81.08 
1990  33.7 1.146  1.340  92.78 
1991  21.1 1.205  1.615  48.21 
1992  16.2 1.267  2.067  29.21 
1993  19.7 1.163  2.380  30.55 
1994  24.5 1.151  2.739  33.00 
1995  29.6 1.206  3.304  33.06 
1996  46.1 1.254  4.143  41.06 
1997  62.6 1.215  5.033  45.89 
1998  76.8 1.168  5.879  48.21 
Source: [ 3]  
 
 
The second consequence is more temporary. A lot of 
people considered the purchase of land as a capital 
investment. These people do not cultivate the land, 
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simply report to the local agricultural office the 
cultivation as a fact, but do nothing. Therefore it is 
very difficult to get reliable data on the true size of 
the uncultivated area. It is surely not an 
overestimation to say that 500 thousand out of 6 
million ha of arable land is left fallow.    
All these facts mean that the utilisation of input 
materials, such as chemicals, has also decreased. 
Thus, the deterioration of the efficiency is much less 
obvious from the economic than from the technical 
point of view. From the environmental point of view 
the decreased level of chemical usage is 
advantageous. For example, recently the quality of 
the water of the shallow lake Balaton has 
significantly improved due to the decreased chemical 
usage in the farmlands around the lake.     
To illustrate the economic consequences of the 
change in the farming system the example of Polish 
agriculture is given here, which chose a different 
path of development.   
 
A COMPARISON OF HUNGARIAN AND 
POLISH AGRICULTURE 
In Poland agriculture has never been subject to the 
„socialist” development path, i.e. no co-operatives 
had been established. Thus, in Poland the farming 
structure remained the same after the political 
turnover.  
Both Hungary and Poland belonged to the group of 
COMECOM countries.  Both of them lost large 
markets after the demolition of this organization and 
the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990's 
the former COMECOM countries could hardly trade 
with one another. Their internal export/import was 
accounted for in (Soviet) rubels. After the political 
turnover and the demolition of COMECOM, the IMF 
suggested for these countries that they should use US 
dollar instead of the rubel in accounting. By 
accepting the advice they immediately lost the 
advantage they had had on each other's markets. The 
new system showed clearly, that the dollar-
equivalent of their former rubel-priced products are 
no cheaper than the prices of the commodities 
coming from the West or the Far-East, and the 
payment was to be made in US dollars as well. 
Furthermore they were short of US dollars, and this 
made trade among themselves extremely difficult. 
From the agricultural point of view the Eastern 
markets collapsed as the successors of the Soviet 
Union were unable to import as much food as earlier.  
Although the political turnover affected Polish 
agriculture, too, as we have seen, the effect was 
much less grave than in Hungary. This is clearly seen 
in the different extents at which the yields of some 
important cereals decreased in the years 1989-1996.  
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of the decrease of the yields of some important cereals in Hungary and Poland in the years 1989-
1996. 
Hungary Poland  Cereal   
Decrease (percentage) 
Barley     6.9     2.9  
Maize     3.5     1.6  
Rye     4.8     2.4  
Wheat     5.5     2.8  
Source: [ 5] . 
 
 
At the late 1950's the agricultures of the two 
countries had had basically the same structure, but 
this was followed later by the collectivization 
process in Hungary. The higher effectiveness of the 
big farms is demonstrated by the wheat yields in 
Table 2, which is based on the data from the 
Agricultural Statistical Database of FAO [5].   
 
THE NEW FARMING STRUCTURE IN 
HUNGARY 
The main characteristic feature of the new structure 
in Hungary is the dominance of the „very-
smallholders”, farmers with tiny plots of a few 
hectares. The present Hungarian farm structure is 
significantly different from the farm structure of the 
European Union, as is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: The present Hungarian farm structure compared to the European Union 
  Number of estates  Area of estates 
   HUN '96     EUR15, '95     HUN '96     EUR15, '95 
10ha >     97.5%     69.4%     52.1%     10.9% 
10-50ha     2.0%     22.1%     29.4%     29.5% 
50ha <     0.3%     8.5 %    18.5%     56.6% 
Source: [ 2]  
 
 
The Hungarian government of the years 1998-2002 
put a special emphasis on the support of 
smallholders, but only in traditional activities. Wheat 
producers, for example,  who farmed land not more 
than 20.8 ha  obtained special financial support. On 
the other hand, these farms are too small to own, and 
efficiently utilise the machines (tractors, combine 
harvesters) necessary to produce cereals. Thus, their 
income must be shared with the owner of the 
technology. The final result is, that for a farm having 
20 ha of land and producing only wheat, the net 
income equals the income of 50 workdays. Then 
either the main income of the farmer must come 
from outside of agriculture or the farmer must live in 
poverty. Even in the case of the first option it is very 
unlikely that the farmer has enough capital from 
other sources for the farm to follow the development 
of the technology.  
For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned, 
that no new technology appropriate for the small 
farms appeared, of course. Furthermore the 
government of the years 1990-1994, who had forced 
the structural changes, offered no special support for 
adaptation to the new farm sizes, either.  
The trend in the European Union is just the opposite. 
The concentration of production is progressing 
continuously. As an example of this phenomenon 
Table 4 summarizes the changes in the sizes of pig 
farms. Similar phenomena is reported by MacDonald 
et al. ([ 6] ) in the United States.   
 
 
Table 4: PIG PRODUCTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Percentage of farms in categories by number of pigs kept 
Country     Year     1-19     20-49     50-99     100-199     200-399     400-999    > 1000 
Germany     1985     14.0     10.9     12.1     18.0     24.6     17.6     3.0 
    1992     4.1     5.6     8.5     13.9     22.4     37.7     7.8 
France     1985     7.3     2.1     4.6     16.9     34.4     26.8     7.8 
    1992     2.7     1.1     1.8     4.9     10.8     37.9     40.8 
Holland     1985     0.8     2.7     7.2     16.3     28.9     33.1     11.0 
    1992     0.1     0.4     1.7     5.5     12.3     34.6     45.4 
Denmark     1985     4.3     9.8     14.7     23.7     27.4     17.4     2.7 
    1995     0.4     1.4     2.9     6.2     13.2     32.4     43.5 
Source: [ 4, 5] . 
 
 
We do not claim that this process has only positive 
effects. It also causes dangers, e.g. a farm with a 
large number of animals face a much higher risk in 
an epidemic, both in the animal hygienic and 
financial respect.  
 
HYPERMARKETS 
A new phenomenon without having any antecedent 
is the recent appearance of the international 
supermarket chains (Metro, Auchan, Spar, Cora, 
Tesco, etc.) in the internal food market of Hungary. 
They are considered as the leading channel of selling 
agricultural products and other household items 
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Hungarian producers are extensively squeezed out 
from this channel. E.g. both German-made and 
Hungarian-made Swiss cheeses are sold for the same 
price, although the price of the German milk is 150% 
of the Hungarian one, and a still higher 
transportation cost is also included in the cost of the 
German cheese. This is why a considerable 
proportion of the Hungarian society shows signs of 
disapproval of them. On the other hand, it is not 
admitted that Hungarian producers cannot deliver 
amounts of supply sufficient for an international 
chain. Furthermore, no attempt was made to call 
professional advice to establish the basis on which 
any kind (financial, organizational, etc.) of support 
could be given to the Hungarian producers to find 
their customers. Of course, there is no need for such 
a support in a normal market economy. But here a 
transient period is discussed, where the transition 
was forced by the government. As a consequence, 
the producers faced a quite new situation due to a 
sudden change, without time allowed for adaptation, 
and the same government that had initiated the 
change, did not help to overcome the adverse effects.  
The international chains run mainly hypermarkets in 
Hungary. A shop is a hypermarket if (1) its 
floorspace is greater than 2500m
2, (2) it has more 
than 10.000 product items, (3) more than 30% of the 
items is non-food and (4) the shop has more than 10 
cashiers. Currently there are only 44 hypermarkets in 
Hungary.  
The hypermarkets have a 15-16% share in the market 
of the daily consumed commodities. This is less than 
it is usually estimated but still remarkable, especially 
considering that the Hungarian market is of 10 
million people. The main customers targeted by the 
hypermarkets are the motorized families. This 
policy, which is reflected in the choice of the 
location of the hypermarkets, restricts the share 
hypermarkets can own on the Hungarian market. 
More than 40 per cent of the population is unable to 
do any shopping in hypermarkets, because they do 
not posses a car ([ 9] ). (Only 1-2 Tesco hypermarkets 
are reachable by free buses, but most of them are not 
approachable by public transport.) 
On the other hand there is no chain of shops in the 
villages. Furthermore, sometimes it is difficult to buy 
very simple kinds of food in rural areas, e.g. 
vegetables, fruits. This is a part of the market where 
other types of shops and chains may get a market 
share. The residential areas of towns also belong to 
this part of the market.  
In Germany the REWE Corporation has two chains 
of stores, namely Penny Market, and Billa. The floor 
area of their shops is 700-800m
2. The shops are less 
luxurious, and operate in a more economical way 
than hypermarkets. REWE Co. is present on the 
Hungarian market with the Penny Market shops. The 
shops run by the REWE Co. make profits 
everywhere, in Germany, Austria, Hungary and other 
Eastern-European countries, too ([ 7] ).   
 
WHOLESALE MARKETS 
Traditionally there is a huge wholesale market for 
fruits and vegetables in Budapest, which has an 
important role in supplying the capital of the 
country. There are also a few wholesale markets for 
flowers in Budapest with lively trading activities. 
Other markets are practically not working or are 
closed. 
A good example for that is the story of the fruit and 
vegetable wholesale market in Kaposvár. Kaposvár 
is a city approx. 200 km south-west from Budapest. 
When its wholesale market opened, the following 
psychological process took place. The producers 
thought that demand would not be high enough for 
them to sell their products there, so they continued 
the old practice of taking their products to sell on the 
wholesale market of Budapest. Similarly, the 
shopkeepers also thought, that supply would not be 
sufficient on the market of Kaposvár, so they 
continued to purchase the needed products on the 
market of Budapest. Due to this self-fulfilling 
expectation, tomato, a product of Kaposvár, was sold 
in Budapest, and was transported back to the same 
town. Tomatoes traveled an unnecessary distance of 
400 km causing an unnecessary cost both to seller 
and buyer. Later the fruit/vegetable wholesale 
market of Kaposvár was closed because of some 
technical reasons. There is no understanding in 
Hungary regarding the possible economic role of the 
wholesale markets. Up to now no such research has 
been going on either. There is no law on agricultural 
wholesale markets. 
The Hungarian producer is traditionally inclined to 
hide his/her income from the authorities. On the 
other hand subsidies are paid in the European Union 
if production is well documented. Furthermore, some 
of these subsidies are paid to organizations of 
producers, and not directly to the producers 
themselves. A wholesale market run by an 
organization of producers might be a successful way 
of satisfying all of these conditions.  B. VIZVÁRI, BACSI, ZS 
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DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL AREAS 
The development of rural areas is a front-running 
political issue in Hungary. There are approx. 200,000 
unemployed people there, which is mainly a 
consequence of the fact, that together with co-
operatives their industrial sideline activities were 
also demolished. In spite of the great political 
interest there are very few constructive elements in 
the discussions about improving rural incomes and 
job opportunities.   
One idea is to increase rural tourism. However, a 
very easy calculation shows, that it is very far from 
being a complete solution in itself. Assuming, that 5 
guestnights will justify the utilisation of one day of 
labour, and there are 250 workdays in a year, and  1 
tourist spends 13 nights on average in the village, 
this means that altogether 19,000,000 tourists per 
year are needed to give enough work for the 200 
thousand unemployed people, which is very far from 
the reality. A complete solution for the problem of 
rural unemployment must be built up of many 
elements, of which rural tourism can be just one.  
Another important element may be to change the 
structure of rural production, i.e. increasing the 
proportion of products requiring higher amounts of 
labour. Practically it means that more horticultural 
products and less cereals should be grown. Hungary 
is traditionally a wheat and maize producer country. 
The quality of Hungarian wheat is very good. On the 
other hand 90% of the word trade of wheat and 
maize is transported by sea. Only the Mid-Asian 
countries, former members of the Soviet Union are 
able to export wheat by railway in high quantities 
([ 8] ). The reason of this fact is the transportation by 
sea being at least 7-8 times cheaper than by train. 
The internal transportation costs in Hungary are even 
more expensive. Hungary has no seaport. The Black 
Sea could be reached via the river Danube and via 
river Tisza, a side river of Danube, but the country 
does not have enough appropriate ports at the rivers, 
either. Thus Hungarian cereal export is restricted to 
the surrounding countries and Poland. This situation 
underlines the necessity of the suggested change.  
The products of horticulture request post-harvest 
operations and/or further processing. The value 
added can be increased this way, too. To achieve 
these changes local firms and integrators should be 
established. A certain part of the agricultural 
subsidies should be used for this purpose.  
The importance of establishing a local firm is not 
only the fact that it offers jobs to some employees. A 
cheese factory, for example, stabilizes the position of 
the cow owners in the village, too. Goods produced 
in smaller quantities have little chance to find a long-
term customer in the new big food markets. This is 
why an integrator is needed, who cares about the 
unified quality and packing of the local product. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper the structural changes of Hungarian 
agriculture caused by the political turnover of 1990 
are surveyed. It is shown that the demolition of the 
former co-operatives caused the emergence of small 
farms which are now the main form of farms 
dominating Hungarian agriculture. The current 
structure has many malfunctions, including 
inefficient land size, lack of capital and up-to-date 
technology. In particular, it is difficult to find 
consumers for rural products of lower quality. The 
hypermarkets belonging to international chains have 
an ever increasing importance in the Hungarian 
market. On the other hand, rural areas are not well-
served by shops. Small food processing firms can 
increase the value added of the products, and at the 
same time decrease unemployment in the rural areas. 
Hovewer, processed food products cannot enter the 
supply of big chains without fulfilling the unified 
quality and packing requirements, supervised by 
integrators. 
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